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Abstract 
Highly Reliable Organisations (HROs) are safety-centric organisations that 
operate in complex environments alongside risky technologies and processes. 
There is a high risk of catastrophe and error in these settings, the consequences 
of which may result in loss of life, financial cost, and damage to the 
environment. “Chronic unease” is a concept originally adopted by Royal Dutch 
Shell describing a mindset that has five predictable attributes that contribute to 
an individual’s and organisational safety culture. The authors of this paper 
describe the attributes of chronic unease in the context of lifeguard operations. 
A case study of a dangerous and dynamic rescue situation from a popular New 
Zealand beach is presented and analysed wearing a ‘cloak of chronic unease’ to 
draw upon the attributes of this concept and to present a discussion about how 
lifeguards, their managers, and leaders may learn valuable lessons from HROs 
to develop safer operations by fostering a similar mindset we have dubbed: “The 
Rescue-Ready” mindset. 
Keywords: lifeguarding, lifeguard safety, rescue, human factors, error, risk 
management, highly reliable organisations, rescue-ready, chronic unease 
Introduction 
Drowning is a leading cause of preventable mortality and morbidity globally in 
both high income (HIC) and low- and medium-income countries (LMIC) 
(WHO, 2015). Lifeguarding is a complex task undertaken in an uncontrolled 
environment with multiple risks including potential harm to the rescuer, harm 
to those being supervised (if things go wrong), requiring high levels of 
vigilance, skill, and a constant state of readiness. Most of the time, lifeguards 
are engaged in surveillance of in-water patrons requiring complex decision-
making processes based on mostly incomplete information. Occasionally, these 
decisions are made under duress where the stakes are high and limited resources 
available to deal with a crisis or emergency. Failures detecting drowning 
behaviour or failure to rescue a drowning victim in a timely manner may result 
in tragedy as the process of drowning can occur within seconds to minutes.  
In this paper, we discuss the lessons learnt from Highly Reliable 
Organisations (HROs) that encourage a concept called “Chronic Unease” as a 
platform for developing a robust safety culture. These lessons may be applicable 
for lifeguards, lifeguard team leaders, or managers of lifeguard services as a 
way of striving to reduce systemic failure, errors, and accidents by frontline 
lifeguards, and may provide a useful ‘world view’ to adopt by operational 
lifeguards.  
What is chronic unease?  
“Chronic unease refers to the experience of discomfort and concern about the 
management of risks. It is a healthy scepticism about one's own decisions and 
the risks that are inherent in work environments” (Fruhen, 2015). Chronic 
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unease is a concept originally developed by the oil and gas industry (Shell 
Contractor, 2019) as a feature of working towards the goal of zero harm within 
their industry. When things go wrong on an oil drilling rig, they typically go 
spectacularly wrong and result in catastrophic harm, including massive loss of 
life, environmental damage, and significant financial costs. While chronic 
unease is primarily a state that typically influences executives and senior 
management, safety experts researching this area propose that an organisation 
(at every level from worker to senior managers), in a constant state of unease, 
will critically support the organisation’s safety record. Chronic unease is a 
hallmark of all HROs (Fruhen, 2015).  
Chronic unease is a mindset typically adopted by senior managers but 
permeates all levels in an organisation with a highly robust safety culture. It 
fosters a healthy world view that: 
1. Mentally projects the development of a situation into the future based on its 
current state. 
2. Does not expect something to be wrong but is constantly on guard and 
prepared when things do go wrong. 
3. Constantly looks for weak signals that may indicate that there is a hole in 
the system, and even small events, no matter how minor, could lead to 
greater failure, so action is taken immediately versus being delayed. 
4. Assumes nothing, questions assumptions, and does not jump to conclusions. 
5. Constantly worries (healthily) about safety and risk. 
These five attributes of chronic unease will be explored within the 
context of lifeguarding, and the application of this world view will be discussed 
with examples provided. Given the complexity of the tasks of lifeguarding, and 
in some cases the high-risk environments they operate in (coupled with the high 
potential for error that may result in catastrophe), we propose lifeguard services 
can improve their level of safety by fostering the attributes of chronic unease at 
all levels of operations.  
What are Highly Reliable Organisations (HROs)? 
Highly Reliable Organisations is a term first described in the 1990s for 
organisations that are recognised for avoiding catastrophic accidents where 
accidents are expected due to the high-risk activity and complexity of the tasks 
they complete (Roberts, 1990). They have managed safety and risk over a long 
period of time in high-risk contexts and often operate in difficult social and 
political environments, utilise risky technologies with a high potential for error, 
and the scale of possible consequences from failure precludes experimentation 
with safety systems. HROs are diverse and not limited to industry. A wide and 
diverse range of HROs and their systems have been studied and identified. 
These range from air traffic control systems, fire command systems (Bigley, 
2001), and some high-risk medical treatment facilities such as paediatric 
intensive care units (Madsen, 2006) .  
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HROs have developed robust safety cultures, and think and act about error, 
accidents, and near-misses quite differently to other organisations. They 
encourage mindful reporting, investigate root causes, and continually strive for 
zero harm to personnel, the environment, and assets. “HROs use mindful 
organising for the unexpected as well as the expected” (Weick K, 2007). 
A Case Study as a Basis for Examining the Utility of Chronic Unease 
Attributes 
We present a case study of an actual incident involving a lifeguard team working 
at a popular surf beach on Auckland’s West Coast in New Zealand. For reasons 
of confidentiality, names and dates have been changed, but the essential facts 
surrounding the events remain intact.  
Background 
These events occurred on an outgoing tide on a crowded (approximately 1,500 
patrons) beach between the flagged patrol area (in New Zealand, the 
recommended swimming area where intensive lifeguard surveillance occurs is 
marked with red and yellow flags). The surf was large (approximately 2.0-
2.5m), and there was a considerable inshore drift towards two large fixed rips 
and both ends of the beach (the beach is approximately 800m long). The 
lifeguard team consisted of six lifeguards; the team leader was highly 
experienced with over twenty years’ experience. The rest of the team were 
similarly skilled and experienced except for one lifeguard who was a foreign 
national on an international exchange programme. The team leader was 
prepared for numerous eventualities including preparing an extra Inflatable 
Rescue Boat (IRB), discussing the potential need for additional resources from 
a neighbouring beach, and setting up a very intensive area for lifeguard 
surveillance. 
Events 
At approximately 11.30am, the surf size increased, and the power of the inshore 
drift increased accordingly. A group of four swimmers were suddenly swept 
into a hole, then continued to drift rapidly into an extremely dangerous area 
close to rocks. The lifeguards lost sight of three of the swimmers, and the team 
went into crisis mode to deal with a rapidly dynamic and dangerous situation. 
The patrolled area was closed, and other beach users ordered from the water as 
the lifeguard team dealt with the crisis. All persons were eventually rescued; 
one swimmer was found submerged. He was retrieved from the water and 
resuscitation was commenced on the beach. He was transported to hospital by a 
rescue helicopter and made a full recovery without any long-term neurological 
consequences. During the incident, information was received by members of 
the public of a possible sighting of one missing person early in the search in a 
location at the other end of the beach causing doubt as to the appropriateness of 
initial search efforts (this was later proved to be a ‘red herring’ and search 
efforts were successful as the team leader elected to ignore the reliability of the 
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report). Several more rescues occurred throughout the day after the patrolled 
area was re-opened.  
Commentary 
These events highlight how quickly lifeguard operations can shift from routine-
mode to crisis-mode. In the final analysis, this team did a remarkable job under 
trying circumstances. In the next section, we highlight how the attributes of 
chronic unease may be useful in preparing and dealing with such situations. In 
the analysis of this case study, we do not criticise the actions of the team; rather 
we use this case as an example to highlight the use of the attributes of chronic 
unease in the real world. Adopting a world view that fosters the attributes of 
chronic unease will not prevent such crisis from occurring per se but may help 
build resiliency in a team to prevent and deal with such situations. We view this 
situation as wearing a ‘cloak of chronic unease’ to see what thought processes 
and actions might augment how we manage human and physical resources to 
prepare for crises like these. 
Attributes of Chronic Unease 
Safety Imagination. The ability to mentally project the development of 
a situation into the future based on its current state. The thinking here is that in 
a state of chronic unease, the lifeguard will gather as much intelligence about 
the situation at hand based on good evidence. Good evidence is data that can be 
validated such as tide times, observation of actual not assumed hazards, and 
aspects of the environment such as the actual surf size, velocity of rips and drift, 
and water temperature. A lifeguard wearing a cloak of chronic unease will 
assume their perception of the situation may be flawed or incomplete. To ensure 
their intelligence is accurate, they will ‘cross-check’ their world view with 
others in the team.  
After gathering data to construct the current state of affairs, the lifeguard 
will then speculate on the potential situation that may develop. This is the crux 
of safety imagination. It is the ability to look beyond the here and now and 
mentally project into the future using pre-existing knowledge, skills and 
experience, and the combined thinking power of the team. An example of 
dialogue a lifeguard team leader might use exemplifying a safety imagination 
might sound like: “OK team, I’m concerned that the outgoing tide may produce 
unsafe conditions, so we need to be prepared for extra vigilance on the turn of 
the tide.” By declaring a possible future, the team is now aware of an unease 
about safety in the future. Disaster may not strike, but if it does, it is partially 
expected and therefore easier to deal with.  
In the case study, the lifeguard team leader did in-fact pre-empt (using 
safety imagination) many aspects of the clinical management of the victim who 
submerged. As soon as the three victims went missing, the team leader closed 
the beach (preventing further task overloading), immediately notified the rescue 
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helicopter, and asked for further assistance from a neighbouring beach. The 
swimmers had not been located at this time, so there was no way of knowing 
medical aid was required, but the leader projected a worst-case scenario and 
made preparations. All ‘just in case.’ These pre-emptive actions saved lives.  
Safety imagination can be used by all lifeguards on a daily basis. Its use 
need not only be used for major events; in fact, when safety imagination is used, 
all events (even minor ones) are viewed as potential initiators of significant 
future events, so are dealt with immediately, thereby interrupting a potential 
cascade or escalation. An example of this would be the lifeguard who is 
watching a small child slowly edge closer and closer to a deep hole. Based on 
the current state, all may seem well, but if the future is projected, a potential 
emergency exists. Better to act now before events cascade into a crisis. For 
experienced lifeguards, reading this may seem patronising. After all, “isn’t that 
what we do?” However, maintaining a constant state of safety imagination isn’t 
as easy as it sounds. It is cognitively draining and requires a constant internal 
dialogue to maintain. It is when we become complacent that safety imagination 
fades, and relatively minor events can creep through unnoticed and become 
significant events. 
Pessimism. A personality trait reflecting a tendency to resist 
complacency and to anticipate failure. Are you someone who has a little voice 
in their head that runs scripts like: “No. Can't be that bad, he'll be fine, 
everything is O.K.,” despite compelling evidence to the contrary? There are a 
number of scripts that can run contrary to the reality of any given situation. 
These are complex cognitive errors beyond the scope of this article. Suffice to 
say, a personality trait that resists the urge to dismiss weak signals (and operate 
as though ‘everything is OK’) when events are unravelling takes discipline and 
practice. Conversely, a script that runs closer to: “Everything seems OK right 
now, but conditions are worsening so it might all turn bad at any moment!” is 
a script underpinned by healthy pessimism. This trait needs to be a habit and is 
dominant in HROs (Weick, 2007).  
In this case study, the lifeguard team leader displays a healthy sense of 
pessimism. Right from the outset, he was clearly anxious about conditions, the 
lack of resources to deal with challenging conditions, and his experience led 
him to adopt a very pessimistic, vigilant and intensive patrolled area (the flags 
were very close together to contain beach users in an area of high surveillance). 
On the day, he had prepared an extra IRB (beyond what is normally prepared), 
and had it on standby, just in case. This is healthy pessimism in action. There 
were no strong signals that things could go wrong and require another IRB, but 
there were weak signals there was potential for its need, so action was taken.  
Is there anything wrong with being pessimistic, resisting the urge to be 
complacent and therefore taking steps to anticipate failure? It’s all about context 
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and intensity. Being overly pessimistic about every situation in every area of 
one’s life can lead to cognitive distortions (catastrophising, for example) that 
can be pathological. There are many types of cognitive distortions; 
catastrophising (one type) distorts one’s view of the everyday world 
disproportionately and irrationally and can lead to an individual disengaging 
with everyday activities or produce anxiety when dealing with relatively minor 
problems (Burns, 1989) . A catastrophising script might sound like: “Why 
bother, people always need rescuing, and they always get into trouble when 
there’s surf. We always end up doing rescues.” Distortions like these are ‘all or 
nothing’ thinking versus a reasoned decision to consider catastrophe possible 
but remain anchored in the reality that it doesn’t always happen or is guaranteed. 
If you've developed the habit of pessimism, this trait runs 
subconsciously in the background of thought and becomes dominant when 
you're receiving weak signals that something is wrong. Experienced effective 
lifeguards and team leaders naturally do this most of the time, and it largely 
goes unnoticed by others, often surprising others when things do go wrong that 
the team leader seems to possess savant-like qualities in predicting future events 
and an ability to be ‘ahead of the eight-ball.’ It’s no accident. They are, and 
perhaps unaware that their dominant behaviour is to be cautiously pessimistic. 
To our knowledge, no research has confirmed this underlying trait is dominant 
amongst experienced lifeguards. Research into this would be useful to 
potentially identify leaders and lifeguards who have this trait, why they have 
this trait, and how to train lifeguards to develop this trait as it is desirable and 
needs fostering. 
A lifeguard may also take a healthy dose of pessimism when planning a 
difficult rescue. Sure, we all like to think we can perform amazing feats of IRB 
driving or surf swimming in difficult conditions. A healthy dose of pessimistic 
self-questioning might scale back your immediate expectations of what you 
think you should do to a more realistic position of what you can do in reality. A 
healthy dose of pessimism may prevent cavalier actions. Pessimistic questions 
might include: 
“But when was the last time I did a rescue in such large surf? Do I have 
skilled help to assist? What if it all goes wrong? Where is my back-up if I get 
into difficulty? There’s only one IRB available and no other experienced 
drivers. Is there a better, safer way? Perhaps a jet-ski or helicopter?” 
Confidence and competence is a double-edged sword. On one level, a 
certain level of confidence in one’s competence is desirable. It is a basic human 
need to avoid feelings of helplessness and the ability to influence the world 
around us according to our own goals. “Our internal assessment of competence 
is subjective either as a feeling of measuring up to the situation, or as a feeling 
of helplessness and fear, as the case may be.” (St. Pierre, 2008). Research in 
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similar industries such as clinical medicine identifies that confidence in (our 
own) skills or capabilities is often misleading, and highly subjective, especially 
in complex situations. For example, if a clinician overestimates their ability to 
cope with an emergency, they are “more likely to take risks because of a wrong 
feeling of being up to the task,” whereas if a clinician underestimates their 
competence they will tend to “act defensively and refrain from taking helpful 
necessary steps.” (St. Pierre, 2008).  
A moral hazard exists when lifeguards either over or under-estimate 
their competence when faced with an emergency. Over-estimation might lead 
to unnecessary risks being taken in a hazardous environment. Under-estimation 
might lead to circumstances where delayed or no action occurs where it is 
absolutely needed. The attribute of pessimism is, therefore, not only useful for 
being prepared for potential catastrophe but may also be a useful mind-trait to 
keep competence in perspective and balance. 
Vigilance. The ability to notice and identify (weak) signals of risks in 
the environment. Vigilance is a highly desirable trait for lifeguards to possess. 
Watching in-water patrons constantly is physically and cognitively demanding. 
Dr. Tom Griffiths (the inventor of the five-minute scanning strategy) states: 
“constant vigilant supervision is an oxymoron” (Griffiths, 2011). 
It is not often appreciated that there are a vast number of variables that 
influence a lifeguard’s level of vigilance, and therefore, ability to detect 
drowning behaviour. Even in optimum circumstances where a lifeguard is 
highly vigilant, he or she is prone to errors originating from a wide range of 
host, cognitive, physiological and experiential factors, as well as a wide range 
of environmental factors. Maintaining vigilance to the task of surveillance is 
another double-edged sword. While engaged in surveillance, a lifeguard’s 
perception is narrowed to the target area so as a result, and in a wider sense, 
situational awareness diminishes. A lifeguard who attempts to maintain overall 
situational awareness, complete other tasks or assignments, and pay a high 
degree of attention to surveillance will compromise their effectiveness at all of 
them. It is for this reason that a lifeguard should always conduct each task 
independently, never both (or all) at the same time. When conducting 
surveillance, they should only be involved in surveillance due to the risk of 
becoming distracted and then fall prey to inattentional blindness (a phenomenon 
where perception is impaired due to distraction).  
Research conducted by Page et al. has identified that a lifeguard’s 
experience is the only reliable independent variable influencing detection of 
drowning behaviour in a simulated drowning (Page, 2011). A detailed analysis 
and explanation of errors is beyond the scope of this paper, however, a basic 
understanding that vigilance alone does not guarantee successful detection of 
drowning behaviour is sufficient to examine the attribute of vigilance as it 
pertains to chronic unease.  
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In the context of chronic unease, looking for weak signals goes beyond 
scanning for overt signs of distress or drowning behaviour. These signals are 
strong, not weak. Looking for weak signals is about looking for problems that 
when seen in isolation may have little if any immediate consequence, but if 
allowed to persist or go unaddressed may escalate into a bigger problem or 
influence in an unexpected way the outcome of an entirely different problem by 
becoming a latent condition.  
In our case study, the team leader divided tasks so no lifeguard was 
conducting surveillance alone (two lifeguards reduce the likelihood of a single 
point of failure) and maintained situational awareness by ensuring he remained 
‘task-free’. He was then able to detect weak signals such as the tidal changes, a 
subtle increase in surf size, and an increase in rip current velocity that may have 
otherwise remained unnoticed by the team as a whole as other lifeguard’s fields 
of perception are narrowed by conducting high-intensity surveillance. Overall, 
these changes in the environmental conditions were not drastic changes; no 
single signal meant much, but when combined, signalled a more sinister 
situation developing. Maintaining vigilance (particularly good situational 
awareness) is a good antidote for preventing a perception error known as change 
blindness. In change blindness, the observer may miss signals because the 
changes (a new or changed stimulus) within the field of perception change 
slowly and go unnoticed (Rensink, O'Regan, & Clark, 1997).  
Vigilance, when combined with projecting a potential future using 
safety imagination, identifies weak signals that can trigger further unease. Using 
the attributes of chronic unease, HROs reduce accidents and errors by taking 
action to avert (by fixing the condition) or plan for failure. Reporting relatively 
minor issues (hazards and risks) is encouraged and rewarded. In environments 
such as these, potential unexpected events or conditions are eliminated, isolated 
or minimised (transformed) before they manifest further. Corrective actions are 
transformed from urgent time-critical responses into planned responses, 
reducing cognitive stressors, workload, and should it occur, expediting crisis 
resolution.  
Worry. A tendency to worry about risk and safety. Let’s be clear. The 
workplace is no fun if everyone is worried all the time, and in the extreme, worry 
can produce pathology. A tendency to worry about risk and safety (in a 
measured way) is, however, the counterbalance to complacency, the basic tenet 
of applying the attributes of chronic unease. HROs tend to place raising 
concerns about risk and safety amongst teams as a high priority, and this 
underpins many operational decisions. Organisations with a less safety-centric 
focus often consider risk and safety as an afterthought or a separate process. In 
our case study, the level of worry and concern for risk and safety is evidenced 
by the team leader’s actions, such as maintaining an intensive patrolled area and 
pre-preparing extra rescue assets. An interview with the team leader, in this 
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case, reveals an underlying healthy predisposition with worry about risk and 
safety versus complacency. 
“I was worried at the beginning of the day and knew it was going to 
be busy.” 
“When things turned bad, I had already thought through my plan.” 
“I worried about the flags (the patrolled area) so focused on 
keeping those as tight as possible.” 
“I didn’t have a decent break because I was worried things could 
turn to sh^% at any moment.” 
“I had already discussed with x patrol (neighbouring beach) the 
plan to back us up if it turned to custard.” 
As discussed, lifeguard work is complex and often undertaken in 
suboptimal conditions. There are long periods of routine and mundane 
surveillance combined with occasional periods of very intense physical activity 
where the stakes are high. Failure to detect drowning behaviour or detecting it 
but not providing flotation and rescue quickly enough can result in harm or 
death of an in-water patron. This tension between the extremes (low arousal 
versus hyperarousal) can in its own right create worry and tension in those 
tasked with lifeguard operations. Most of the time there is the expectation that 
nothing will go wrong, but there is also an expectation that one will be called 
into action to rescue someone whose predicament is a result of not detecting 
their behaviour soon enough. There is also the situation feared by all lifeguards 
where a drowning victim shows no subtle or obvious signs of distress prior to 
submersion. In these cases, it is usually a non-swimmer who lacks the ability to 
float (although occasionally this can occur when a swimmer suddenly becomes 
incapacitated due to a medical condition, eg. Epilepsy). In this regard, these 
situations create an ever-present level of intra-personal worry and a daily 
reminder of the importance of the role of a lifeguard (or anyone tasked with in-
water supervision).  
Excessive worry about risk and safety, however, can lead to anxiety, and 
if that state is prolonged, is not healthy. The attributes of chronic unease call for 
a healthy dose of worry centred on risk and safety that is present in the 
background of thinking, but not so dominant it overwhelms normal cognitive 
functioning or creates excessive physiological symptoms of stress. If worry 
about risk and safety is a dominant state, one needs to address the underlying 
reasons for its generation the same way as one addresses weak signals. The 
conditions need to be identified and remedied before they snowball to become 
a significant problem. Once addressed and the issue closed, worry is less likely 
to build and become normalised. Eventually, if worry about certain conditions 
become normalised, then complacency (in the form of apathy) is established, 
which is not consistent with a positive safety culture. Lifeguards need to be 
encouraged to express any worry they have about risk and safety to transform 
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concerns into positive action (by addressing conditions creating the tension), in 
turn reducing the levels of worry.  
Figure 1. An ‘inverted U’ relationship between the usefulness of unease versus 
the level of unease. Note that low levels of unease increase risk of complacency 
and excessive levels of unease coupled with the usefulness of unease can induce 
anxiety. There is an optimum level of unease in promoting usefulness (Fruhen, 
2015). 
 
Experience. Whether you have been involved in an incident before. A 
hallmark of HROs is their ability to review failure and success to continuously 
improve their systems, operations and individual performances. Experience 
provides the basis for looking beyond the immediate task at hand by referencing 
similar incidents and circumstances from the past, gaining an understanding of 
the events surrounding those incidents, and learning from the lessons post-
incident.  
In the area of medicine, it is true clinicians can have thought biases based 
on the frequency and proximity of past events. If a new event presents similar 
to one encountered previously, clinicians can be drawn to favour a clinical 
diagnosis based on the previous like case. This form of reasoning is known as 
rule-based reasoning, or more specifically frequency gambling, and is a 
recognised pattern of reasoning amongst experts as a way of easing cognitive 
load by using heuristics (‘short-cuts’) instead of reasoning in a deliberate, slow 
way by creating a hypothesis, testing a theory and measuring the results. In high-
stakes environments, these cognitive short-cuts are highly effective at solving 
most problems, but like all forms of reasoning is prone to errors. As discussed, 
a detailed analysis of such errors is complex, and beyond the scope of this paper, 
however, it is sufficient to understand that experience influences one’s ability 
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to select appropriate rules to solve problems either successfully or not. Past 
crises also influence behaviour and reasoning in the present. It is human nature 
to overreact to a situation if a previous event like the one encountered didn't go 
well or had less favourable outcomes. Reflecting on previous crises and the 
lessons learnt can strengthen performance in the future and builds resiliency 
(Weick, 2007). Experience of similar adverse events in the past gives a person 
a ‘heads-up’ to the present and might shape an accurate mental model of the 
situation that others may not share, as they may not have read the signals (weak 
or strong) of an unfolding crisis. 
At the same time, other members of the team may have experienced an 
adverse event more recently than the team leader, and so they are more attuned 
to recognising weak signals that lead to catastrophe. Their past experience opens 
up patterns of recognition that others may not have recognised so a different 
mental model of the situation at hand is formed and they have a ‘heads-up’ to 
the potential seriousness of an otherwise weak signal. This early recognition 
(right or wrong) is of no use unless the mental model is shared, otherwise it 
serves no useful purpose other than hindsight. Encouraging sharing of mental 
models is a crucial skill within teams that work in high-stakes environments and 
deal with crises, and this process of communication is best facilitated in a team 
with a flat hierarchy. A flattened hierarchy is encouraged during a crisis so team 
members, no matter their position or rank in the hierarchy are encouraged to 
speak up and share mental models, identify problems, offer solutions and 
challenge conflicting ideas if required. For example: “Team leader, the last time 
I saw a child showing signs of distress like this, he submerged very quickly…I 
am curious why we are not responding,” may be all it takes for a team member 
to share their mental model of the situation at hand, and escalated their concerns 
about inaction, potentially jolting a team out of complacency into a state of 
vigilance and action.  
Thinking. Ability to question assumptions and not jumping to 
conclusions. Thinking is complex. Explaining thinking even more so. If we 
accept the reality that human thinking can be flawed, that we will and do err 
with alarming frequency, then that mindfulness will serve us well when 
analysing thought through the lens of chronic unease. 
Crises and high stakes situations rob us of the time required for slow, 
powerful thought, so there is a tendency to revert to rule-based thinking. Rightly 
or wrongly, this default thinking can expedite a solution (if the right rule is 
applied for the right situation). An individual with a habit of chronic unease 
accepts there are occasional failings in their own and the team's reasoning and 
the rules used to solve problems. They remain open to the possibility of other 
solutions and encourage input from others. They have accepted the reality of 
human limitation and the fragility of normal problem solving and functioning 
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while under duress, so they use cognitive aids such as algorithms and checklists 
to guide problem-solving and formulating a management plan.  
In our case study, examples of where the attributes of chronic unease 
shapes thinking is difficult to assess (as we don’t see someone’s thoughts), 
however, such thinking manifests as behaviour, and we can see some behaviour 
amongst the team and the leader that might indicate a dominant pattern of 
thought that questions assumptions and avoids jumping to conclusions. We 
propose the following behaviours are indicative of such thought in this case: 
1. The decision to close the flags during the crisis was driven by the 
assumption matters might get worse, not better quickly. 
2. The decision to call emergency medical services and a rescue helicopter 
early assumed a high potential for its need (despite clinical evidence) not 
assuming ‘everything will be OK.’ 
3. The decision to call for support early from a neighbouring beach’s lifeguards 
as an additional resource versus assuming the team could handle the 
situation despite an initial impression that the team was in control of the 
situation. 
4. The team leader received information early in the initial crisis about a 
sighting at the other end of the beach. This information was well-meaning 
but conflicted with the team’s mental model that the victim was located 
elsewhere. The team leader questioned the information and arrived at a 
logical conclusion it was probably inaccurate, so avoided jumping to 
conclusions on one small piece of irrelevant information. 
Questioning assumptions is a vital skill, especially during periods of 
duress. During a crisis, information can be scarce, unreliable, and become 
irrelevant quickly as the situation changes rapidly (St. Michael, 2008). Effective 
leadership during such times requires collaboration with other team members to 
assertively challenge the validity of information, quickly disregard irrelevant 
information, but at the same time, remain open to other possibilities versus 
jumping to conclusions. Cross-checking and recapping information frequently 
amongst team members using effective communication is one antidote to 
building a platform for questioning information and the avoidance of jumping 
to conclusions as it cross-references mental models and allows for clarification 
in case of assumption. Communication errors amongst teams under duress have 
been identified that can contribute to a faulty team performance in a critical 
situation. Avoiding these errors is especially important in the early phases of 
crisis as incorrect assumptions at the outset can lead the team into actions that 
are also wrong or flawed. While detailed analysis of communications errors is 
also beyond the scope of this paper, in summary, common communication 
errors identified in critical situations include: Unspecified receiver, problems 
with articulation and terms, information overload, team members becoming 
‘tight-lipped’, conflicts resolved with passivity or aggressiveness, poor 
listening, and unclear relationships (St .Michael, 2008). 
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Summary: Chronic Unease to Rescue-Ready 
Chronic unease is not a novel concept and while originally developed by Shell 
for senior managers in a high-stakes industry such as oil and gas, the attributes 
of a chronic unease mindset have been identified amongst other HROs where 
preoccupation around safety and risk are dominant features of their safety 
culture. The authors of this paper propose that the attributes of chronic unease, 
as described by experts in this area, could be a powerful state of being lifeguards 
can adopt to improve individual and team performance to assist the avoidance 
of failure and errors by empowering lifeguards to structure their thinking around 
risk and safety, and identifying conditions that can lead to failure early. 
While recognising the concept of chronic unease already exists, we see 
subtle differences in the application to a lifeguarding context. Firstly, chronic 
unease is predominantly focused on accident and error prevention in high-risk 
industries, and secondly, these settings (while the stakes for failure are high) are 
not primarily focused on a single task such as surveillance and rescue. The 
attributes of chronic unease are, therefore, a holistic mindset applicable to all 
areas of industrial processes. This mindset is of use to the individual lifeguard 
conducting surveillance, and the lifeguard team leader charged with managing 
a team of lifeguards in a dynamic environment, producing a change in 
organisational culture that could potentially influence policymakers. We have 
called this mindset “Rescue-Ready” to distinguish the attributes of chronic 
unease in the lifeguarding context. It succinctly captures the overall goal of 
thinking in such a manner. It has connotations of a lifeguard who is thinking 
about all the aspects of rescue, acting to prevent the need for rescue, but is at a 
moment’s notice, ready for rescue. No matter the terminology, the overall goal 
of discussing a mindset we propose is called Rescue-Ready is to highlight that 
as a profession directly involved in managing risk and safety, the wider 
lifeguard community can learn valuable lessons from other industries, 
particularly HROs. There is a lack of scientific studies investigating many 
aspects of lifeguard practice. The few that do exist are focused on technical 
skills (e.g., surveillance or swimming ability) versus underlying human factors 
underpinning reasoning, communication, teamwork, errors, decision-making 
and attitudes. We believe more research is needed in this area; in particular, 
qualitative research methodologies to investigate what are common underlying 
attributes of highly effective lifeguard behaviours and thinking. This would 
provide some evidence to support our hypothesis that highly effective lifeguards 
display many attributes described within a state of chronic unease. The case 
study used in this paper has exemplified a Rescue-Ready mindset and how this 
creates positive results when used during a highly dangerous situation.  
We propose the attributes of a Rescue-Ready mindset be included in 
basic lifeguard training as the profession strives to be as error and accident-free 
as humanly possible. Instruction in human factors like these is relatively new, 
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and in a profession where the stakes of failure are so high, is too important not 
to be included at all levels of lifeguard operations.  
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